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Illusion - Is Seeing Really Believing?
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Illusion - Is Seeing Really Believing (1998)(Marshall Media)[Mac-PC].iso
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00442_Text_re27t.txt
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1997-02-04
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In this discussion, I have
been referring to knowledge in
the sense of knowing
something about the external
state of affairs being viewed,
and I have been arguing that
such knowledge only affects
perception under special
circumstances. However,
knowledge in the sense of
stored memory of prior
experience is another story. In
previous chapters, we have
seen many examples in which
memory of prior experience
affects perception. The
successful organization and
recognition of fragmented
figures, the preference to
perceive the white region as
figure in the illustrations of
the horse and profile, and,
possibly, the tendency to
perceive certain line drawings
(such as those of cubes) as
three-dimensionalΓÇöΓÇôall are
instances in which perception
is enriched by past experience.
In these cases, I would argue
that the relevant past
experience must be in the form
of visual perceptions that have
left behind visual memory
traces. Prior perceptions via
other sensory modalities will
not be effective, nor will prior
nonperceptual experiences. But
a visual memory of a cubelike
structure can be effective
because of its partial similarity
to the initial stage of
perception of the line drawing
seen later. Such similarity is
crucial for the accessing of the
appropriate memories and does
not obtain between the initial
visual percept and memories in
other sense modalities or in the
form of nonperceptual stored
knowledge. Perceptual
enrichment based on such
visual memories is not
incompatible with what I am
saying here about the
limitations of the effects of
knowledge on perception. Past-
experience effects of prior
visual memories can occur
because they in no way do
violence to the role of the
stimulus or to other laws of
perception. Rather, they are
perfectly compatible alternate
perceptions of a stimulus that,
logically speaking, is
ambiguous.